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Partisanpatternsofcompliancewithpublichealthmeasuresarea featureofearlyCOVID-19
responses. In many cases, these differences in behaviour relate to pre-existing group
identities. However, in times of rapid societal change, novel opinion-based groups can
emerge and provide a new basis for partisan identification and divergent collective
behaviour. Here, we use network methods to map the emergence of opposing opinion-
basedgroupsandassess their implications forpublichealthbehaviour. Ina longitudinal study,
wetrackedpublichealthattitudesandself-reportedbehaviour ina sampleofUKparticipants
over four time points. Network visualisation reveal a rift in attitudinal alignment over time
andthegenesisof twodistinct groupscharacterisedby trust, ordistrust, in science (Study1a;
N = 253). These groups also diverge in public health behaviour. In a brief follow-up study
(N = 206),wefind that this opinionpolarizationpartially reflects underlying societal divides.
We discuss implications for opinion-based group research and public health campaigns.
Effective societal responses to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2) and the associated infectious disease (COVID-19) pandemic require long-term and
large-scale trust among disparate groups in society (Vaughan&Tinker, 2009).Worryingly,
there is reason to believe that partisan compliance is a feature of COVID-19 public health
responses (e.g., Allcott et al., 2020; Van Bavel et al., 2020). Even as restrictions ease, there
is a danger of subsequent waves of infections if public health messaging cannot engender
solidarity (Haslam et al., 2018). Tracking the emergence of partisan rifts in public health
attitudes allows social psychologists to map identity-based factions in public health
behaviour.
Social influence is an important moderator of public health messaging. For example,
communications implicitly convey group norms (Nightingale, Quayle & Muldoon, 2017)
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
*Correspondence should be addressed to Paul J. Maher, Department of Psychology, University of Limerick, Castletroy, Co.
Limerick, Ireland (email: Paul.Maher@ul.ie).
DOI:10.1111/bjso.12396
1
and this can lead to misperceived health risks (Berkowitz, 2004) and divergent health
behaviour (Jetten et al., 2014). In the United States, attitudes and behavioural responses
towards COVID-19 rapidly diverged on political party lines (Wise et al., 2020), with
democratsmore likely than republicans to report vigilant handwashing and the avoidance
of large crowds (YouGov, 2020). Indeed, there is evidence suggest a partisan rifts in
health behavior, even after controlling for alternative explanations (Allcott et al, 2020;
Gollwitzer et al. 2020)1.
Partisan divisions in health attitudes and behaviours are detectable in the United States
as they fall relatively cleanly along political divides. However, as previously seen during
the Brexit debate in the United Kingdom, new ‘opinion-based groups’ (McGarty, Bliuc,
Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009) can emerge from social processes without clear relations to
prior groups or socio-political structures. Even in the US, the presence of ideological
structure among public attitudes is often overemphasised (Converse, 1964). Therefore, it
is important to be able to track the dynamic emergence of any partisan rifts in public
health attitudes without using preconceived categories or retrospective inference. For
clarity, we describe these emergent opinion-based structures as factional to emphasize
that they offer a new basis for identity alignment, as opposed to partisan structures that
align with pre-existing socio-political identities. In this paper, we track public health
attitudes in a sample ofUKparticipants during the early stages of theCOVID-19 pandemic.
Using a novel network-based method, we explore whether opposing attitude-based
clusters emerge over time and investigatewhether factional attitude alignment becomes a
basis for divergence in public health behaviour.
Opinion-based groups
Attitudinal overlap can be the basis for perceived similarity and social group formation
(Macy, Deri, Ruch, & Tong, 2019), as observed in opinion-based groups (Bliuc et al.,
2015). Opinion-based groups are groups formed around shared opinions. Importantly,
these groups can form rapidly through online interaction (Garcia, Galaz, & Daume, 2019)
and foster forms of identification that transgressmore categorical groupboundaries. Here,
a single topic can become a nexus for social identification (Bliuc et al., 2007) and
intergroup conflict (Bliuc et al, 2015). For example, climate change ‘sceptics’ and
‘believers’ have distinct social identities based around global warming attitudes (Bliuc
et al., 2015). A further defining feature of groups formed around shared attitudes is the
ease with which they facilitate the coordination of behaviour.
Shared attitudes are a basis for collective identity and agency (McGarty, et al., 2009),
since once you know what you stand for it is easy to agree on how to act. Consensus on
health-related attitudes can influence health behaviour (Montoya-Williams & Fuentes-
Afflick, 2019) and facilitate coordinated online activity (Garcia et al., 2019). For example,
Garcia et al. (2019) tracked the rapid formation of an online community of Twitter users
connected through their disapproval of non-meat diets. In anticipation of an upcoming
Lancet report highlighting the science behind healthy and sustainable eating, the
community coordinated the proliferation of #yes2meat as ameans to effectively dominate
coverage of the launch on Twitter. Indeed, many forms of health communication are
susceptible to misinformation and partisan persuasion (Broniatowski et al., 2018). We
already seemotivated partisan persuasion by disparate groups in the COVID-19 pandemic
1 Please note, these papers are pre-prints and have not been peer-reviewed.
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(e.g., protests against lockdown), and this can undermine the solidarity required for
public health compliance.
Polarization and attitude networks
In times of social crises, attitudes rapidly coordinate and polarize (Smith et al., 2019) as
people seek clarity from leaders and similar others (Kruglanski et al., 2006; Mueller,
1970). Thus, during the Brexit process, previously innocuous opinions like one’s view of
the EU became a catalyst for long-term realignments in British politics (Hobolt, Leeper, &
Tilley, 2020). Similarly, economic and political attitudes polarized in thewake of theGreat
Recession (McCarty, Poole, &Rosenthal, 2016) and the election of Donald Trump (Maher,
Igou, & Van Tilburg, 2018). This attitude polarization may build upon pre-existing rifts
(e.g., political divides) but it is often not reducible to political or demographic
categorizations (McGarty, et al., 2009). COVID-19 has spurred societal change at an
alarming rate, and this too will shift the structure of attitudes in society.
Network methods reveal how even small changes can lead to rapid shifts in otherwise
stable attitudinal relationships (Dalege et al., 2016). Assessing the connection between
attitudes in a network helps explain the central role of identity in coordinating beliefs and
behaviour (Brandt,Sibley,&Osborne,2019). Importantly, attitudespropagate throughgroup
structures (Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008) and can quickly coordinate into factional
alignment. We propose that networks of attitude agreement simultaneously produce
symbolic structures and group structures that bind people together (MacCarron et al., 2020;
Quayle, 2020) and that social crises (e.g., pandemics) accelerate this process. In two
complimentary studies, we investigate (i) the emergence of factional alignment in health
attitudes during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, (ii) consequences for maintain-
ing public health behaviour, and (iii) the contribution of pre-existing social categories.
Study 1a
In the United Kingdom, public trust in health officials is high and typically not a partisan
issue (Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018). However, in times of crisis, novel attitude
coordination can occur as people seek clarity and certainty (e.g., Mueller, 1970). This
study aims to (i) investigate whether emerging factions can be detected in public health
attitude coordination and (ii) assess how this corresponds to public health behaviour.
Methods
Participants
Based on a preliminary network analysis of representative UK data with the same items
(Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018), we estimated that at least 200 participants would be
required to visualize opinion-based groups. To accommodate longitudinal attrition, we
aimed for 300 participants at Time 1 (T1). Participation was restricted to UK residents
recruited online through Prolific Academic (Prolific.ac) and paid £0.75 per time point.
We planned three waves of data collection to coincide with significant events in the
UKGovernment response toCOVID-19.We collected T1 data on 9March, three days after
the first reported fatality in the United Kingdom. We excluded three participants for
failing an attention check, leaving 297 (239 women; Mage = 34.73, SD = 11.16). We
collected Time 2 (T2) data from the same participants a week later (16 March; N = 286
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participants), three days after UK risk level was raised to high. We removed five for failing
an attention check and nine others could not bematched to T1. This left 272 (215women;
Mage = 34.80, SD = 11.21).
Time 3 (T3) datawere collected aweek later (23March), three days after the closure of
non-essential business and the ban on ‘non-essential’ travel in the United Kingdom
(N = 253). Two participants were removed for failing attention checks and a further 16
could not be matched to both T1 and T2. This left a final sample of 235 (184 women;
Mage = 35.60, SD = 11.41) participants for analysis across all three time points.
Materials and procedure
Online supplementary materials contain all items answered by participants (https://osf.
io/a9hdn/?view_only=ee44ced8b3ed4ca0824f0150f60b60b4). We measured public
health attitudes with 11 items from the Wellcome Trust health survey (Wellcome Trust
Global Monitor, 2019). These assessed participants’ trust in: science, scientists, the
government, doctors, journalists, charity workers, traditional healers, community, and
vaccines.
We measured compliance with public health advice with three items relating to
physical distancing andhandwashingwhich formedone compliance scale (T1a = .70; T2
a = .74; T3 a = .73)2.
Finally, three items assessed epistemic clarity. We asked participants how well they
understoodCOVID-19 precautions, howmuch theymade sense and howmeaningful they
were (T1 a = .79; T2 a = .76; T3 a = .75). Participants responded using 7-point scales
(1 = not at all; 7 = a great deal).
Results
Analytical approach
First, a bipartite graph (i.e., network) of public health attitudes was constructed for each
survey time point. This is a graph with two types of nodes, where edges can only connect
nodes of different types. The bipartite graph canbeprojected either to showhowpeople are
linked by shared attitudes or attitudes are linked by the peoplewho share them. In Figure 1,
we show the participant projection at the three different time points. Here, a link represents
theproportionof attitudes sharedby twoparticipants. In time3,weobserve twoclusters that
are linked by a total of four edges (see supplementary materials for further details).
A similar method is used for the attitude projection in Figure 2. Here, the edges
represent the number of people sharing these attitudes. If the edge is blue, most
participants align on these attitudes, if red there is mostly disagreement. For example,
many participantswho trust doctors distrust government and vice versa. Please see online
supplementary materials for more details.
Group genesis
Figures 1 and 2 reflect a specific form of consensus-based polarization, not evident in
conventional mean-based comparisons. K-means clustering confirms the two distinct
2 The study survey also included other measures that were unrelated to the current studies aims. Two behavioural measures were
no longer relevant after lockdown was announced. These are included in supplementary materials.
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groups evident in attitude networks at T3, and a chi-square independence test confirmed
the correspondence of these groupings with those identifiable in the figures above,X2(1)
= 186.31, p < .001. There is a larger cluster of white nodes (the science-trusting cluster;
N = 141) and a smaller cluster of yellownodes (the science-sceptic cluster;N = 87) at T3.
These emerged as consensus built within distinct groupings and differences built
between them. Over time, the number of people combining positive attitudes towards
science with positive attitudes towards government and charity becomes smaller
(evidenced by the reduction in edges across these components).
We verified the clustering evident above by assessing individual-level attitude change
between participants in each cluster in a repeated measures MANOVA with time varying
within-subjects, clusters between-subjects, and attitudes towards doctors, science,
scientists, and vaccines as multiple DVs. We found a significant multivariate effect of
time (F[12, 206] = 3.08, p < .001, g2 = .15, Λ = .85), cluster (F[6, 212] = 71.08,
p < .001, g2 = .67, Λ = .33) and a time x cluster interaction (F[12, 206] = 7.55,
p < .001, g2 = .30, Λ = .69). Specifically, attitudes towards scientists and doctors
differed significantly across time, with trust in scientists growing from T1 (M = 2.87,
SD = 1.01), to T2 (M = 2.95, SD = 1.01) to T3 (M = 3.12, SD = 1.00), F(2, 434) = 3.49, p
Figure 1. The participant projection of the survey at each time point. Blue edges represent two
participants who agree on many attitudes. Yellow nodes at T3 represent the sceptics cluster.
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= .031, g2 = .02 and trust in doctors growing from T1 (M = 3.28, SD = 1.00), to T2 (M =
3.39, SD = .92), to T3 (M = 3.49, SD = .88), F(2, 434) = 4.92, p = .008, g2 = .02.
However, these averages mask the time x cluster interaction, and univariate analysis
reveals this is predominantly driven by a divergence in attitudes towards science, F(2,
434) = 23.95, p < .001, g2 = .10 and scientists, F(2, 434) = 21.50, p < .001, g2 = .09.
Trust in science progressively decreased among those in the smaller cluster and increased
among those in the larger cluster (see Figure 3). Hence, we refer to these clusters as
science-trusters and science-sceptics, although we note that the network approach
reveals attitudinal combinations not evident from analysing these variables indepen-
dently. Importantly, this system-level polarization would not have been evident without
the network visualisation.
Behavioural compliance and epistemic clarity
We investigated whether these T3 clusters reflect opinion-based groups by assessing
differences in behaviour compliance and epistemic clarity at T3. Participants in the
Figure 2. The attitude projection at each time point. Blue edges represent agreement and red
disagreement. The weight of an edge corresponds to the number of participants sharing similar response
to those items. In T3, there are no strong blue edges connecting the lower and upper clusters.
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science-sceptic cluster reported significantly lower behavioural compliance at T3
(M = 5.28, SD = 1.46) compared to those in the science-truster cluster (M = 5.70,
SD = 1.21), F(1,226) = 5.50, p = .020, g2 = .024, 90%CI [0.002, 0.065] and significantly
lower epistemic clarity (M = 6.44, SD = 0.74) than the more trusting group (M = 6.68,
SD = 0.72), F(1,226) = 5.94, p = .016, g2 = .026, 90% CI [0.003, 0.068]. Overall,
attitude-network analysis has enabled us to identify novel groups, for which public
health messaging appears to have divergent effects.
Study 1b
Study 1b explores whether the factional attitude alignment in Study 1a builds upon
existing social divides and whether the attitudinal clusters we identify reveal something
that was less evident from other means of Categorisation.
Methods
Participants
We followed up Study 1a participants at a 4th time point (T4) on April 6th, two weeks
after T3 participation. Altogether, 261 participants took part, three failed attention
checks and a further 41 could not be matched to participants who took part in all
three previous time points. This left us with a total sample of 217 (171 women;
Mage = 36.06, SD = 11.52).
Measures
We assessed a range of political and socio-economic demographic variables.
Political measures. Wemeasured how people voted in the 2016 Brexit referendum, as
well as their views on Brexit on a 1-7 scale (1 = strong remain; 7 = strong leave). We also
assessed political orientation (1 = left wing; 7 = right wing) and 2016 general election
vote.
Figure 3. Mean levels of trust in science (1 = not at all; 4 = a lot) within each opinion-based group across
all time points. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Socio-economic measures. We measured annual income level (1 = less than £10,400;
7 = more than £104,000), educational level (1 = primary education; 7 = doctoral




We assessed how people in attitude-based clusters established at Study 1a differed in
Brexit views, income, education, political orientation, and perceived social status.
Clusters differed significantly in these five measures (see Table 1). Participants in the
science-sceptic cluster favoured leave over remain, reported a lower average income,
lower average levels of education, and lower perceived social status. Chi-square
independence analyses tested associations between cluster and Brexit, general election
2019 vote, or residential area. Only Brexit vote was significantly related, X2 (2) = 7.12,
p = .029. Although there was a higher than expected portion of leave voters in the
sceptics cluster (n = 30; from 81), there was also a substantial number in the science-
truster cluster (n = 27; from 129). Furthermore, therewere a number of non-voters in the
sample (n = 39). Neither general election vote (p = .088) nor residential area (p = .237)
was significantly related to attitude clusters.
We assessed the contribution of each of these demographic factors in a multiple
binary logistic regression. Specifically, we examined whether the probability of a
participant belonging to either attitude-based cluster was related to income, Brexit
view, education, political orientation, or perceived SES. The model significantly
predicted group assignment, X2 (4) = 21.78, p < .001, with 67.6% of cases accurately
classified. Brexit view was a marginally significant predictor, B = .164, SE = .086,
p = .057, OR = 1.18, 95% CI [ 0.99,1.40] and the other variables had a non-significant
unique effect.
Health behaviour
There were no significant correlations between levels of behavioural compliance at T3
and Brexit view (r = .046, p = .501), education levels (r = .013, p = .849), income
levels (r = .041, p = .755), or perceived social status (r = .074, p = .275).
Overall, this analysis suggests that these emerging attitude-based factions relate to
existing rifts in society, both political and socio-economic. However, these groups cannot
be reduced to any one category while still capturing divides in COVID-19 behaviour.
Table 1. Differing demographics and political views across attitude-based clusters
Trusters Sceptics
F g2 pMeans (SDs)
Income level 4.13 (1.62) 3.50 (1.52) 7.99 .037 .005
Perceived Status 5.47 (1.46) 5.04 (1.39) 4.48 .021 .035
Education level 4.50 (1.24) 3.90 (1.25) 11.39 .052 .001
Brexit view (1 = remain; 7 = leave) 2.51 (1.90) 3.44 (2.21) 10.47 .048 .001
Political orientation (1 = left; 7 = right) 3.14 (1.39) 3.57 (1.33) 4.92 .023 .028
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Discussion
A bipartite network visualisation revealed factional attitudinal alignment emerging over
time among UK participants sampled over a crucial 3-week period of the COVID-19
pandemic. This method provides a straightforward and theoretically informed way to
conceptualize and inductively identify opinion-based groups. These distinct attitude-
based factions differed in behavioural compliance, suggesting that trust in science and
health officials is a core basis for emerging COVID-19 opinion-based groups.
The observed factions partially reflect underlying societal divides, such as income and
educational disparities. However, these do not explain discrepancies in health behaviour.
Instead, we observed a rapid emergence of factional consensus that did not obviously
correspond to pre-existing identity frameworks. Similar identity dynamics emerged
around the ‘Brexit’ referendum, when opinion-based groups rapidly coalesced across
party lines, disrupting a relatively stable political system (Hobolt, Leeper, & Tilley, 2020).
In contrast, other countries have seen health beliefs and behaviour coalesce along pre-
existing partisan lines (e.g., Allcott et al., 2020).
Practically, our results suggest directions for tailoring public health messages to
maximize behavioural adherence (Hunecke, et al., 2010) and avoid factional divergence.
Our analysis reveals an emerging basis for partisanship organized around trust or distrust
of scientists anddoctors. Using bipartite attitude alignment to identity distinct clusters,we
observe factional differences in behavioural compliance and clarity around the reasons for
restriction. In other words, an identifiable group of people are not getting (or accepting)
the message. We expect that the increasingly polarized opinion ecosystemmakes it more
likely that factions will respond differently to health messaging.
Our visualisation of the evolution of factions suggests that stakeholders should focus
somewhat on rebuildingunderstanding of science, including thenotion that scientistswill
often be wrong before they are right and that disagreements are a natural part of the
scientificprocess.Thismaybeespecially important in the futurewhenvaccineuptakemay
beacrucial factor indefeating thevirus. Ingeneral, (at the timeofdata collection)people in
the United Kingdom trusted their communities and trusted vaccines. Future researchmay
explore the effectiveness of messages that emphasize how scientists are members of our
community and how vaccine development helps them to protect our communities.
Importantly, although our T3 networks demonstrate schism, our T1 networks show a
strong overlap in public health attitudes. We note that these processes are dynamic and
our strongest practical recommendation is for opinion networks to be tracked over time
before, during, and after health behaviour campaigns to assess the possible emergence of
opinion-based groups that may undermine messaging or require different strategies.
Theoretically, we wish to make three points. First, shared attitudes are building blocks of
identity (Quayle, 2020). Even attitudes about public health can quickly coalesce into opinion-
based factions. These rapidly emerging coalitions can become the basis for new emergent
partisan identities. Previous research suggests that identities can develop when people are
motivated to communicate their attitudes towards social change, because they encounter a
situation that contradicts their view of how the world should be (Smith, Thomas &McGarty,
2015). In the present study, it is easy to imagine how the rifts that opened in the public health
opinion space in the early weeks of the COVID-19 crisis might be co-opted by politicians, the
media,orotheragentsinserviceoftheiridentityentrepreneurshipandpoliticalambitionsinthe
months and years to come (Reicher, Haslam, &Hopkins, 2005).
Second, the coordination of opinions can become a basis for the coordination of action
(McGarty et al., 2009; Smith, et al., 2015) as we have observed in the United States where
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republican dissatisfaction with lockdown has been expressed in dangerous public
protests. This is not to say that the samewould inevitably happen in the United Kingdom;
but rather that the emergent factional structures in the opinion space provide a starting
point for such a social process to gather momentum.
Third, partisan polarization does not require extremism (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008),
which is why we refer to polarization as attitude coordination. The factional opinion
structures identified in the present analysis are not easily detected with conventional
linear methods, but are evident in the bipartite network visualisation and cluster analysis.
This work further demonstrated the benefits of network analysis for understanding
dynamic social psychological phenomenon (see Abelson, 1967; Brandt et al., 2019;
Dalege et al., 2016).
Limitations
We have only limited evidence that the clusters we identify exist as psychological
groups (Turner, 1982). Given the emergent nature of this phenomenon, it was not
possible for us to measure group identification ahead of time. Rather, our research
aims to track the emergence of a novel identity space (Quayle, 2020) based upon an
increasing alignment of shared public health attitudes. We assert that opposing
clusters of shared opinions foster a readiness to define oneself and others with
respect to a group identity in the future (Bliuc et al., 2007). Indeed, the bipartite
attitude networks we derive easily capture the presence of pre-existing political party
membership with socio-economic attitude data.
Conclusion
Factional opinion coordination is dynamic and unpredictable yet it can have grave
consequences for society. During a pandemic, when many must act collectively to
protect the vulnerable few, it is important to maintain non-partisan solidarity in public
health attitudes. We have presented a novel means of detecting factional attitude
alignment, and the possible genesis of opposing opinion-based groups, that could
inform ways to inoculate public health messages against partisan interpretations.
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